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a b s t r a c t
In this exploratory study we investigate the impact of the implementation of IFRS on corporate social disclosures
(CSD) within the context of stakeholder theory. We measure the level of CSD in annual reports using a disclosure
instrument based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report “Guidance on Corporate
Responsibility Indicators in Annual Reports”. We ﬁnd that IFRS adoption had a differential effect on CSD based on
a ﬁrm's institutional setting i.e., the stakeholder–management relationship prevalent in their institutional environment. Firms in the stakeholder countries did not have a signiﬁcant change in the level of CSD following the
mandatory adoption of IFRS while ﬁrms from the shareholder countries experienced a signiﬁcant increase over
the same period resulting in shareholder countries providing an overall higher level of CSD after IFRS adoption
than stakeholder countries. These ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms' reactions to the requirements of IFRS and the
stakeholder pressure to provide additional CSD are inﬂuenced by institutional environment. Further, our results
provide support for the use of stakeholder theory to predict the level of CSD.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

In September, 2009 the Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers
and Central Bank Governors representing the leading industrialized
and developing economies met to discuss global economic issues. One
of the results of that meeting was a call for countries to “redouble
their efforts” and complete the convergence process with International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 2011 (Whitehouse, 2009).
While the US and several other countries did not meet the 2011 deadline, they are moving in the direction of convergence. According to the
IASB over 120 countries currently require or permit the use of IFRS
(IASB, 2010).
Over the same period that the world has been moving toward adoption of IFRS there has also been increased interest in corporate social disclosure (CSD), traditionally deﬁned as the information provided on the
effects of the ﬁrm's operations on employees, suppliers, customers, and
communities (Clarkson, 1995; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers, 1995; McVea &

Freeman, 2005; Spence & Gray, 2007).4 Reﬂecting this interest, the
largest global companies increased their CSD by 30% over the three
year period 2005 to 2008 (KPMG, 2008). While there are many disclosure channels for public CSD (e.g., standalone corporate sustainability
reports, company websites, press releases, and annual ﬁnancial reports
or annual reports) calls for more integration of CSD in annual reports
have been made by corporate stakeholders (KPMG, 2008; Social
Investment Forum, 2009) and researchers (Hubbard, 2009). Bjorn
Stigson, president of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, stated that “sustainability reporting must be a part of the management of business performance. Increasingly this information should
not be in separate sustainability reports but part of broader annual performance reports” (KPMG, 2008). From a research perspective, Bhimani
and Soonawalla (2005) argue for an integrative framework for disclosure encompassing corporate ﬁnancial information alongside corporate
responsibility reporting.
The increasing interest in integrated CSD reporting and the move to
IFRS affect the disclosure demands that ﬁrms face. Full IFRS adoption
mandates approximately 4000 disclosures (Leone, 2009). In contrast,
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4
CSD has been referred to by many names including corporate social reporting (Gray
et al., 1995), corporate responsibility reporting (KPMG, 2008), corporate sustainability
reporting (Adams & Whelan, 2009) and environmental, social and governance reporting
(Social Investment Forum, 2009). Throughout this paper we use CSD to refer to the information that a company provides on the social and environmental impact of its operations.

1. Introduction
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CSD is largely voluntary in nature (UNCTD, 2008; van der Laan, 2009).
While there is limited empirical evidence on the relationship between
ﬁrms' voluntary disclosure practices and mandatory disclosure requirements, mandatory and voluntary disclosures are likely interrelated
(Bagnoli & Watts, 2007; Dye, 1985; Einhorn, 2005; Francis, Nanda, &
Olsson, 2008). Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010, p. 335) fortify the
need to jointly consider the relationship between voluntary and mandatory disclosure suggesting that “one of the biggest challenges and opportunities facing researchers is considering the interactions among
the various information sources”. Adding to the literature in this area
we attempt to better understand how ﬁrms' CSD policies are affected
by the mandatory disclosure requirements of IFRS. More speciﬁcally,
we consider how ﬁrms respond to this changing disclosure environment in the context of stakeholder theory.
Stakeholder theory predicts that ﬁrms respond to pressure from
stakeholders based on the power, legitimacy and urgency accorded
the various stakeholder groups (Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007;
Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Ullmann, 1985). We question whether
ﬁrms will respond differentially to IFRS adoption based on the traditional stakeholder–management relationship prevalent in their institutional
environment. For ﬁrms in countries with institutional environments
that are historically more stakeholder-oriented, the adoption of IFRS focuses and expands annual report disclosures on ﬁnancial information
increasing the urgency associated with shareholding stakeholders.
Thus, the adoption of IFRS may shift the stakeholder–management
relationship in these countries toward a shareholder–management
relationship as ﬁrms work to meet the increased ﬁnancial disclosure requirements of IFRS. This shift in focus may be reﬂected in less emphasis
on communication of non-ﬁnancial information through reduced CSD
in annual reports. Conversely, ﬁrms from shareholder-oriented countries who have historically focused on their shareholder relationship
will not experience the same sense of shareholder urgency upon
adopting IFRS. Accordingly, we suggest that these ﬁrms are likely to
react to stakeholder pressure to provide CSD, increasing the level of
CSD in annual reports post-IFRS adoption.
While concern and caution have been expressed over the implications of mandating a single set of global accounting standards both
from regulatory (Haller, 2002; Schipper, 2005; Sunder, 2009) and ﬁnancial statement comparability perspectives, little research has examined
the effect that implementation of IFRS will have on non-IFRS disclosures
in annual reports.5 Therefore, whether the adoption of IFRS affects CSD
in annual reports is ultimately an empirical question. To address this
question, we examine the level of CSD provided by large European
and Australian ﬁrms, for the two years prior to (2003–2004) and two
years following the adoption of IFRS (2006–2007). Characterizing countries as stakeholder-oriented and shareholder-oriented based on legal
origin, code-law and common-law respectively, allows us to infer
ﬁrms' traditional stakeholder–management relationships. While this
legal origin distinction is admittedly a simple measure of stakeholder
orientation it has been effective in identifying differential inﬂuences
on ﬁnancial reporting (Ball, Kothari & Robin, 2000; Hope, 2003; Jaggi
& Low, 2000).
Using a measurement instrument based on the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTD) report “Guidance
on Corporate Responsibility Indicators in Annual Reports” (UNCTD,
2008), we ﬁnd that ﬁrms in the shareholder-oriented countries in our
sample, the UK and Australia, experienced a signiﬁcant (p b .01) increase in CSD from pre- to post-IFRS adoption whereas ﬁrms domiciled
in the stakeholder-oriented countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy
and the Netherlands, did not experience a signiﬁcant change in the
level of CSD over the same period. The results of this study provide useful information to investors and organizations interested in CSD as well
as to the IASB as it considers the Disclosure Framework project. These
5
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) provide a review of the literature on the effect of IFRS
adoption on accounting quality in the European Union.
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ﬁndings suggest that mandatory disclosures may impact the level of
voluntary disclosures within certain institutional settings. Speciﬁcally,
we contribute to the literature by extending the understanding of the
impact of institutional factors on ﬁrms' disclosure practices, an area of
increasing importance to ﬁnancial statement users, preparers and policy
makers as we move to a global set of accounting standards (Healy &
Palepu, 2001). Considering the increasing interest in CSD, our ﬁndings,
though tentative, highlight the need for further research in this area.
2. Related literature
2.1. Stakeholder theory
Stakeholder theory, as described by Freeman (1984), contends that
successful ﬁrms effectively manage their stakeholder relationships, deﬁning any group affected by a ﬁrm's operations as a stakeholder in
that ﬁrm. Thus, successful ﬁrms consider the interest of groups beyond
those that have a ﬁnancial stake in the ﬁrm, i.e., shareholders and creditors, to include non-shareholding groups such as, employees, suppliers,
customers, and communities (Clarkson, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997).
Clarkson (1995) proposed evaluating corporate social performance
using a stakeholder framework. His work and that of Donaldson and
Preston (1995) helped develop stakeholder theory into an operational
framework that has been used in accounting literature to evaluate how ﬁrms communicate with their stakeholders through CSD
(Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Gray et al., 1995; Prado-Lorenzo,
Gallego-Alvarez & Garcia-Sanchez, 2009; van der Laan Smith, Adhikari
& Tondkar, 2005). In a review of the CSD literature, Gray et al. (1995)
conclude that stakeholder theory provides a method of understanding
CSD practices within the larger view of social and political theories.
Socio-political theories, including stakeholder theory, imply that the
extent of CSD is related to stakeholder pressure. Thus, ﬁrms facing
greater pressure will provide more CSD. Prior research, primarily as it
relates to environmental performance, has provided conﬂicting results.
Some researchers provide evidence consistent with a negative relation
between environmental performance and CSD arguing that “companies
facing greater exposure, as companies with poorer environmental
performances… would be expected to provide more extensive environmental disclosures” (Patten, 2002, 763). Other research ﬁnds a positive
relation between environmental performance and CSD (Al-Tuwaijri,
Christensen & Hughes, 2004; Clarkson, Li, Richardson & Vasvari, 2008;
Clarkson, Li, Richardson & Vasvari, 2011). These conﬂicting results led
Clarkson et al. (2008, p. 325) to suggest that “these [i.e., sociopolitical] theories are not robust in predicting the level of discretionary
disclosure”.
Given these contradictory results, and the debate over the ability of
stakeholder theory to predict the level of CSD, we contribute to this debate and explore this issue within the context of a changing disclosure
environment which requires managers to consider competing stakeholder pressures. We argue that a test of stakeholder theory should consider overall CSD in annual reports since changes in the level of CSD may
be reﬂective of shifts in the management relationship with shareholders
versus non-shareholding stakeholders. The stakeholder–management
relationship is the core of stakeholder theory, as Freeman and Phillips
(2002, p. 334) state that “a ‘stakeholder theory’ is one that puts as a primary managerial task the charge to inﬂuence, or manage, or balance the
set of relationships that can affect the achievement of the organization's
purpose”. Balancing the interests of various stakeholder groups requires
managers to make trade-offs between conﬂicting interests.
Determining which stakeholder interests gain management attention depends on the importance attached to the stakeholder group.
Ullmann (1985), examining the relation between CSD and social and
economic performance, proposed a model with stakeholder power as
its theoretical basis. He deﬁned power in terms of stakeholder control
of “resources critical to the organization” (p. 552) proposing that the
more powerful the stakeholder group, the more attention management
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will accord their demands. Building on this work Mitchell et al. (1997)
argue that the stakeholders that managers pay attention to are those
that have the most compelling combination of the attributes of power,
legitimacy and urgency. They deﬁne legitimacy based on social acceptance of relevancy and urgency or “the degree to which stakeholder
claims call for immediate attention” (p. 867). Supporting this concept
of stakeholder identiﬁcation and salience, Parent and Deephouse
(2007) ﬁnd a “positive relationship between number of attributes and
salience” (p. 18).
The attribute of urgency introduces the concepts of time-sensitivity
and criticality into the stakeholder–management relationship. A stakeholder must consider its demands as both time-sensitive and important
to be considered as urgent by managers. Applying the theory of
stakeholder salience to the shareholder–management relationship,
Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld (1999) ﬁnd that urgency was the “best
predictor” of shareholder salience for the CEOs of the large public
ﬁrms included in their sample. We focus on this attribute since the
country-level mandatory adoption of IFRS, with its emphasis on shareholder disclosures, introduces urgency into the shareholder relationship
increasing the power of this stakeholder group.
Underlying stakeholder attributes is the understanding that they are
dynamic and that the importance placed on the stakeholder relationship will ebb and ﬂow based on management's perception of these attributes. Further, since management's views of stakeholder attributes are
based on perceptions, they are not objectively determined but are
“socially constructed” (Mitchell et al., 1997). As such, we argue that
the importance placed on a stakeholder group varies not only over
time but systematically based on differences in the institutional setting.
2.2. Institutional setting
Prior research has found that the level and quality of CSD in annual
reports varies cross-nationally (e.g., Gray, Javad, Power & Sinclair,
2001) with continental European ﬁrms providing higher levels of CSD
than non-European ﬁrms (Meek, Roberts & Gray, 1995; van der Laan
Smith et al., 2005; Williams & Ho Wern Pei, 1999; Zarzeski, 1996).
Disclosure research seeking to identify the reasons for these observed
cross-national differences has primarily focused on two country-level
institutional factors, culture and legal origin (e.g., Doupnik & Salter,
1995; Gray, 1988; Meek et al., 1995; Orij, 2010; van der Laan Smith
et al., 2005; Zarzeski, 1996).
Reasoning that cultural values inﬂuence management's perception
of stakeholder attributes, van der Laan Smith et al. (2005) ﬁnd a positive
relation between a country's emphasis on social issues and the level and
quality of CSD. They argue that “since societal values inﬂuence managerial values, managers in countries that exhibit strong concern with social issues would be more cognizant of and attach greater importance
to stakeholder claims” (p. 132). Supporting these results, a crossnational study of 600 ﬁrms from 22 countries by Orij (2010) ﬁnds an
association between CSD levels and the stakeholder orientation of a
national culture.
Studies examining the impact of legal origin on disclosure practices
have used legal origin to represent the type of corporate governance
model that was most prevalent in the reporting country, referring to
common-law countries, such as the US, UK and Australia, as having a
shareholder-oriented model and code-law countries, such as most continental European countries, as having a stakeholder-oriented model
(Ball et al., 2000). This shareholder/stakeholder distinction is primarily
based on differences in legal and accounting structures (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, 1998).
In common-law countries these institutional features work to
protect and inform shareholders resulting in wide-spread corporate
ownership and a focus on the shareholder–management relationship.
Jaggi and Low (2000) examining the inﬂuence of legal origin on ﬁnancial disclosures of 401 ﬁrms from six countries ﬁnd evidence of this
shareholder focus; ﬁrms from common-law countries had higher

ﬁnancial disclosure levels than ﬁrms from code-law countries. Institutional structures in code-law countries provide less investor protection
discouraging shareholder ownership while encouraging broader board
representation (e.g., banks and employees). As a result, ﬁrms in codelaw countries tend to accord non-shareholding stakeholder groups the
same level of legitimacy as shareholders providing a setting that
encourages higher levels of CSD.
Corporate governance systems have also been characterized as
shareholder or stakeholder based on the corporate worldview prevalent
in the country, contractarian or communitarian (van der Laan Smith,
Adhikari, Tondkar & Andrews, 2010; van der Laan Smith et al., 2005).6
In contractarian countries “shareholder wealth maximization is the primary purpose of the corporation” whereas in communitarian countries
corporations “have social responsibilities not only towards their stockholders but to all other stakeholders” (van der Laan Smith et al., 2005,
p. 129). Thus, contractarian societies, such as the common-law countries, the UK and Australia, are labeled shareholder societies and communitarian societies, such as those found in code-law continental
European countries, are labeled stakeholder societies.
A general ﬁnding from this stream of research is that a country's institutional features as characterized by the stakeholder/shareholder orientation inﬂuence CSD. However, these ﬁndings are primarily based on
disclosure studies conducted within the context of domestic reporting
systems. Sunder (2009) expressed concern over the concept of convergence of accounting standards arguing that variations in reporting systems that developed in particular countries were based on societal
norms and cultures. He proposes that prescribing a cross-national set
of accounting standards will lead to a “reduction in the ﬁt between
the local economic environment and the ﬁnancial reports” (Sunder,
2009, p. 109), implying a loss of individual country characteristics. In
contrast, a study by Yip and Young (2012) suggests that institutional
factors remain important after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. They
ﬁnd that the information comparability following the mandatory
adoption of IFRS is greater among ﬁrms from countries with similar
institutional environments than ﬁrms from countries with different institutional frameworks. Examining the CSD practices of ﬁrms complying
with IFRS provides additional insight into the ability of institutional
features to inﬂuence ﬁrms' behavior.
2.3. IFRS adoption and the disclosure environment
The IASB identiﬁes ﬁnancial stakeholders as the primary users of
general purpose ﬁnancial statements, speciﬁcally, “existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors” (Conceptual Framework
IASB.org, accessed 2011). It follows that ﬁnancial disclosures are
the focus of IFRS which contain more disclosure requirements than
most continental European countries' domestic accounting standards
(Daske & Gebhardt, 2006; Ding et al., 2007; Jermakowicz &
Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). Within this changing ﬁnancial disclosure
environment, the pressure to provide CSD, which is primarily voluntary
in nature, continues to increase as evidenced by the overall growth in
CSD reporting by corporations through annual reports and standalone
reports from less than 1500 in 2002 to over 3500 reports in 2009
(CorporateRegister.com, 2010; UNCTD, 2008; van der Laan, 2009).
KPMG in its review of the state of CSD noted that “one of the most signiﬁcant ﬁndings of the 2008 survey is that corporate responsibility
reporting has gone mainstream — nearly 80 percent of the largest 250
companies worldwide issued reports, up from about 50% in 2005”
(KPMG, 2008).
Disclosure research generally ﬁnds that managers have private information about a ﬁrms' operations and if this information is perceived
as being desired by shareholders then managers will choose to disclose
it, as lack of disclosure will be interpreted negatively (Bagnoli & Watts,
6
See Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram and Walsh (1999) for an in-depth discussion of
contractarianism and communitarianism.
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2007; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). Given the notable
change in the climate for CSD over the last decade this implies
that, ceteris paribus, managers will react by increasing the level of
CSD. However, we believe that the replacement of a country's domestic
accounting system with IFRS may differentially change the disclosure
environment. Speciﬁcally, the impact of IFRS adoption on CSD may be
dependent on whether the disclosing ﬁrm is in a traditionally stakeholder or shareholder-oriented country.
Research examining the interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures indicates that the content and level of mandatory disclosure in ﬁnancial reports affects the level of voluntary disclosure
(e.g., Bagnoli & Watts, 2007; Dye, 1985; Einhorn, 2005; Francis et al.,
2008). A general ﬁnding from this literature is that increases in mandatory disclosure may lead to decreases in voluntary disclosure
(e.g., Bagnoli & Watts, 2007; Dye, 1985; Healy & Palepu, 2001;
Verrecchia, 2001), that is, voluntary and mandatory disclosures are possible substitutes. IFRS is based on institutional structures common in
shareholder-oriented countries. Given the similarities between the domestic accounting standards in shareholder-oriented countries and
IFRS, ﬁrms located in these countries will likely already have mandatory
disclosure requirements similar to that of IFRS. Managers in these countries may not perceive a shift in urgency associated with shareholding
stakeholders upon adoption of IFRS allowing these managers to be
more sensitive to changes in the CSD reporting climate. Accordingly,
ﬁrms from shareholder-oriented countries may be minimally impacted
by the adoption of IFRS. In contrast, the domestic accounting standards
in traditionally stakeholder-oriented countries share fewer similarities
with IFRS and typically mandate far less disclosures than required by
IFRS (Ding, Hope, Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2007). When faced with the increased mandatory reporting requirements of IFRS, managers in ﬁrms
domiciled in stakeholder-oriented countries may perceive more urgency
associated with shareholding stakeholders shifting the stakeholder–management relationship toward shareholder claims. This will be reﬂected
with less emphasis on voluntary communication of non-ﬁnancial information through CSD in annual reports. This argument implies that IFRS
adoption will have a differential effect on CSD depending on a ﬁrm's
stakeholder orientation with ﬁrms in traditionally shareholder-oriented
countries increasing the level of CSD and ﬁrms in traditionally
stakeholder-oriented countries reducing the level of CSD.
If the mandatory requirements of IFRS act as a substitute for voluntary disclosures, it is possible that shareholder-oriented ﬁrms may reduce their voluntary disclosures with the adoption of IFRS. Dye (1985)
also proposes that in certain circumstances a ﬁrm may wish to enhance
the credibility of its mandatory disclosure by providing collaborating
voluntary disclosure, in which case the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosures would be complementary. Additionally,
the more detailed disclosures required by IFRS may complement some
of the voluntary disclosures that were already being made by ﬁrms
domiciled in the stakeholder-oriented countries (Gigler & Hemmer,
1998). Thus, the adoption of IFRS may not necessarily result in reduced
CSD for stakeholder-oriented ﬁrms. Given the contradicting predictions
and lack of extant research examining CSD practices in the context of an
international ﬁnancial reporting system, whether adoption of IFRS
affects the level of CSD in annual reports remains an open question. To
explore this issue we focus on the following research question.
RQ: Does the traditional stakeholder or shareholder orientation of a
country inﬂuence the effect of IFRS adoption on CSD in annual
reports?
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500 list (Fortune, 2006). We selected Fortune Global 500 companies
since size has consistently been identiﬁed as a predictor of disclosure
level in general (Hope, 2003) and CSD speciﬁcally (Gray et al., 2001;
Meek et al., 1995). We focused on European and Australian companies
since they are subject to IFRS reporting requirements and had similar
IFRS adoption timetables. The European Commission required adoption
of IFRS in 2005 for publically traded European Union (EU) companies.
In line with the EU adoption timetable, the Financial Reporting Council
of Australia directed all for-proﬁt entities to fully comply with IFRS in
2005.7 To be included in the sample, ﬁrms were required to have annual
reports available for the four years including 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007.
We selected annual reports from these years to provide a basis for comparison around the 2005 adoption of IFRS. We excluded 16 of the 59 original companies, resulting in a ﬁnal sample of 43 companies. Companies
were excluded for the following reasons. Six companies used US GAAP
during the period under investigation (Switzerland (4) and United
Kingdom (2)), four companies did not have data available (France (2),
Norway (1), and Spain (1)), and six companies used IFRS for ﬁnancial
reporting prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS (Germany (6)). The
companies included in the ﬁnal sample represent seven countries and
six industries with six ﬁrms from environmentally-sensitive industries
in manufacturing including chemicals and allied products (1), petroleum
and coal products (4), and primary metal industries (1).8
Following prior research, this study identiﬁes the stakeholder/shareholder orientation of a country based on its legal origin, classifying codelaw countries as stakeholder-oriented and common law countries as
shareholder-oriented. We recognize that there are a great number of
other factors that may distinguish one country from another making
the legal origin distinction a simple measure of stakeholder orientation.
Thus, our ﬁndings should be interpreted with the limitations of this
measure in mind. We do note, however, that this distinction has been
effective in identifying differential inﬂuences on ﬁnancial reporting
(Ball et al., 2000; Hope, 2003; Jaggi & Low, 2000; Simnett, Vanstraelen
& Chua, 2009; van der Laan Smith et al., 2005).
Given that the majority of the continental European countries are
stakeholder-oriented countries, our sample contains ﬁve countries in
the stakeholder group, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands and two countries in the shareholder group, Australia and
the UK. This results in 27 companies in the stakeholder group, approximately 63% of the sample, and 16 companies in the shareholder group,
approximately 37% of the sample (see Table 1 for sample descriptives).

3.2. CSD measurement
CSD was measured using a content analysis technique. Content analysis is a method of codifying text into groups or categories thus allowing
the material to be transformed into quantitative scales that permit further analysis. Content analysis has been widely used by researchers trying to obtain reliable and valid information from texts (Boesso & Kumar,
2007). The importance of using this methodology for understanding
stakeholder reporting practices is emphasized by Guthrie, Petty,
Yongvanich, and Ricceri; “Several theoretical lines of inquiry have
proﬁted from the application of content analysis as an approach to
data collection and analysis. Stakeholder and legitimacy theory are
two of the better known” (2004, p. 283).
CSD data was collected from the companies' 2003, 2004, 2006, and
2007 annual reports. The annual report is recognized as a primary method
of communicating with ﬁnancial as well as non-ﬁnancial stakeholders
(Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998) as evidenced by research observing

3. Methodology
3.1. Sample
The sample for our study includes the top ﬁfty European companies
and all nine Australian companies included on the 2005 Fortune Global

7
See Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski (2006) for a concise history of the IFRS
adoption process in the EU and Haller (2002) for a detailed analysis of the process.
8
Consistent with Gamble, Hsu, Jackson, and Tollerson (1996), ﬁrms were classiﬁed as
environmentally sensitive based on SIC code. Of the seven environmentally-sensitive
ﬁrms, two are domiciled in shareholder-oriented countries and four are domiciled in
stakeholder-oriented countries.
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Table 1
Sample characteristics.
Country

Number of ﬁrms
Preliminary
sample

Excluded

Final
sample

%

Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
The Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Switzerland
Total stakeholder orientation

1
11
15
4
4
1
1
4
41

0
2
6
0
0
1
1
4
10

1
9
9
4
4
0
0
0
27

2.33
20.93
20.93
9.30
9.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
62.79

Australia
United Kingdom
Total shareholder orientation

9
9
18

0
2
2

9
7
16

20.93
16.28
37.21

Total sample

59

12

43

100.00

variations in the quality and level of CSD in annual reports (Boesso &
Kumar, 2007; Brown & Deegan, 1998; Freedman & Stagliano, 1992;
Gray et al., 2001; Meek et al., 1995; Neu et al., 1998; van der Laan Smith
et al., 2005). We argue that corporate reporting through the annual report
provides a vehicle for examining shifting stakeholder relationships
through the choices managers make in the information they disclose. It
is a proxy for the stakeholder pressures perceived by company managers.
We believe this argument is consistent with the theoretical origins of
stakeholder management which strives to integrate the management of
economic and social objectives (Harrison & Freeman, 1999).
To measure the level of CSD in annual reports we developed a measurement instrument containing 68 key indicators obtained from the
“Guidance on Corporate Responsibility Indicators in Annual Reports”
(2008) prepared by the UNCTD Secretariat (see Appendix A).9 The
UNCTD report was developed based on discussions with the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of
Accounting and Reporting and other experts as well as reviews of
other existing guidelines such as those issued by the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI). The indicators allow for external veriﬁcation and are
based on performance measures. The indicators are grouped within
the following twelve categories: trade, investment, and linkages; employment creation and labor practices; technology and human resource
development; health and safety; government and community contributions; corruption; water use; energy use; global warming; ozonedepleting substances; waste management; and, consolidation policy.
We developed our instrument to measure the presence of quantitative
performance data since the purpose of our study is to measure the level of
high quality CSD. That is, CSD that is veriﬁable, provides information on
actual performance, and is free of management bias. Prior research has
found that ﬁrms use narrative annual report disclosures to positively
shape their image and manage impressions (Cho, Roberts & Patten,
2010; Neu et al., 1998; Smith & Tafﬂer, 2000). Measuring only the
presence of quantitative indicators mitigates the bias that may be present
in word or sentence counts. There are several reporting guidelines
available including, among others, the GRI Sustainability Reporting
Guidelines and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)
14000 series. We based our measurement instrument on the UNCTD
method since the indicators in this report were developed speciﬁcally
for communication to stakeholders through an annual ﬁnancial report
following the framework of IFRS (UNCTD, 2008).
The content of each annual report in our sample was analyzed to determine the presence of an indicator and coded 1 for that indicator if it
was present and 0, otherwise. The presence of information is easily
identiﬁed and has been evaluated as an appropriate unit in previous
9

The environmental indicators were obtained from the UNCTD 2004 Eco-Efﬁciency
Indicators manual incorporated by Appendix into the 2008 report.

research (e.g., Barth, McNichols & Wilson, 1997; Campbell, Craven &
Shrives, 2006; Freedman & Stagliano, 2002; Patten, 2002). By only considering whether the information is reported in the annual report, this
measure ignores the quantity and nature of the information disclosed.
However, this measurement mitigates forms of researcher bias as it
overcomes the problems of allocating a portion of a page, counting
words or sentences, and the inherent subjectivity in determining the
characteristics of information. Consistent with the presentation in the
UNCTD report, no weighting was assigned to the indicators. Thus, the
highest score that could be obtained was 68. One researcher analyzed
all of the reports and a second researcher analyzed a sample of the reports and checked consistency among the different categories. Interrater reliability on the sample reports was over 90%. Any questions or
discrepancies were referred to a third researcher for disposition.
3.3. Statistical analysis
Given that the same sample ﬁrms were used during all periods
under investigation (i.e., “pre-” and “post-mandatory” IFRS adoption)
we use a repeated measures ANOVA controlling for company within
the stakeholder and shareholder groups to examine the change in CSD
after adoption of IFRS.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) on the CSD
scores and ﬁrm-level variables are provided in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Tables 2 and 3 describe the ﬁrms domiciled in the stakeholderoriented countries and Tables 4 and 5 present the ﬁrms domiciled in
shareholder-oriented countries.
As shown in Tables 2 and 4, stakeholder countries had a higher level
of mean CSD than the shareholder countries in 2003 however, this relationship reversed in 2004. Immediately prior to adoption of IFRS in 2004
and after adoption of IFRS in 2006 and 2007 ﬁrms in the shareholder
countries provided more CSD than ﬁrms in the stakeholder countries.
Overall, using our measurement instrument, there is a low level of
CSD in all years. The mean CSD for the shareholder and stakeholder countries in 2003 was 15.19 and 16.26, respectively. Therefore, on average the
shareholder countries reported on approximately 22% of the 68 possible
indicators and the stakeholder countries reported on approximately
24%. Although higher, we also observe a low level of CSD in 2007 for
the shareholder countries (19.63 or 29%) and the stakeholder countries
(15.81 or 23.3%). We believe that the low level of reporting is due to
using performance based indicators in the measurement instrument.
This ﬁnding is similar to Morhardt, Baird and Freeman (2002) who examined the extent to which the 1999 environmental reports of the 40 largest
global industrial companies met reporting guidelines and noted that the
lowest scores (13.4%) were from application of the ISO 14031 guidelines.
They concluded that “most companies have not embraced the idea of
reporting on environmental condition indicators” (p. 225).
In planning the research design, consideration was given to cultural
and ﬁrm-level variables identiﬁed in prior research as inﬂuencing CSD
(Hope, 2003; Hossain, Perera & Rahman, 1995; Hussein, 1996; Jaggi &
Low, 2000; Kim & Kim, 2010; Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995;
Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001; van der Laan Smith et al., 2005; Watson, Shrives
& Marston, 2002; Zarzeski, 1996). The use of the same sample ﬁrms for
multiple years in a repeated measures model with company included
maintains the culture and industry variables constant across every
ﬁrm. Additionally, the use of a repeated measures model mitigates the
need for including net income and ﬁnancial leverage in the ﬁnal model.10
10
While net income and ﬁnancial leverage may have changed during the period evaluated, as a practical matter the assumption of control over these variables appears reasonable as variations in these variables may be due to company level factors (Baldwin, 1984).
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Table 2
Components of corporate social disclosure (stakeholder).
2003
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
(Firms)
Total corporate
social disclosures

16.26
−8.54
27
Trade, investment
1.26
and linkages
−0.45
27
Employment
4.15
creation and
−2.21
labor practices
27
Technology and
1.41
human resource
−1.15
development
21
Health and safety
0.70
−0.82
13
Government and
1.15
community
−0.36
contributions
27
Corruption
0.74
−0.53
19
Water use
0.67
−1.18
8
Energy use
0.67
−1.00
11
Global warming
0.78
−1.09
11
Ozone-depleting
0.22
substances
−0.80
(ODS)
3
Waste
1.15
management
−1.68
12
Consolidation
3.37
policies
−1.55
26

Table 3
Firm-level variables (stakeholder).

2004
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
(Firms)

2006
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
(Firms)

2007
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
(Firms)

2003/2007
Change
Mean
(Std. Dev.)

13.7
−6.35
27
1.11
−0.32
27
3.74
−2.16
27
1.22
−0.89
21
0.56
−0.75
11
1.11
−0.32
27
0.81
−0.48
21
0.44
−0.93
7
0.48
−0.70
10
0.52
−0.70
11
0.04
−0.19
1
0.63
−0.93
12
3.04
−1.65
26

15.33
−6.31
27
1.04
−0.19
27
3.59
−1.80
27
1.30
−1.14
20
1.00
−1.07
14
1.15
−0.36
27
0.89
−0.42
23
0.63
−1.04
10
0.81
−0.68
18
1.07
−0.78
21
0.07
−0.27
2
0.70
−1.14
12
3.07
−1.47
27

15.81
−7.62
27
1.15
−0.36
27
3.56
−2.04
26
1.26
−0.98
21
0.89
−1.05
13
1.22
−0.42
27
0.93
−0.27
25
0.93
−1.44
15
0.81
−0.83
16
1.00
−0.88
18
0.11
−0.42
2
0.85
−1.23
14
3.11
−1.42
27

−0.45
0.92
−0.11
0.09

Variable

Net income
(€m)
Leverage
(total liabilities /
total assets)
Number of pages

2003

2004

2006

2007

2003/2007

(Std. Dev.)

(Std. Dev.)

(Std. Dev.)

(Std. Dev.)

Change

2965.93
−4392.48
0.78
−0.14

4317.22
−6093.31
0.77
−0.15

5401.89
−5834.07
0.75
−0.17

6175.41
−6523.79
0.75
−0.17

3209.48
−2131.31
−0.03
−0.03

184.44
−84.73

178.22
−74.87

207.19
−96.98

223.15
−111.34

38.71
−26.61

−0.59
0.17

ηi(j) effect of ith company nested in levels of different ﬁrms, and
bk effect of reporting period.

−0.15
0.17
0.19
−0.23
0.07
−0.06
0.19
0.26
0.26
−0.26
0.14
0.17
0.22
0.21
−0.11
0.38
−0.30
0.45
−0.26
0.13

While not a direct focus of our study, concerns have been voiced
about the length of annual reports under IFRS having a constraining
effect on CSD (Corporate Register, 2010). Therefore, it is interesting to
note the change in the number of pages in the annual reports from
2003 to 2007, the period two years prior to and two years after adoption
of IFRS. As shown in Tables 3 and 5, the mean number of pages in annual
reports in the stakeholder (shareholder) countries increased from
184.44 (173.25) pages in 2003 to 223.15 (213.06) pages in 2007. Paired
t-tests analysis (two-tailed), not reported, of the difference in mean
number of pages reveal a signiﬁcant (p b 0.05) increase in pages across
this period in both shareholder and stakeholder groups.
4.2. Overall results
The linear model upon which the repeated measures analysis of
variance is based takes the following form:
Y ið jÞðkÞ ¼ μ þ ηið jÞ þ bk
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ð1Þ

where:
Yi(j)(k) a measurement of CSD for the kth reporting period (i.e.,“pre-”
and “post-mandatory” IFRS adoption) on the ith company of
type j,
μ overall mean effect,

As shown in Table 6, the inﬂuence of company is signiﬁcant in all
cases indicating that the level of CSD is related to unmeasured factors
unique to each ﬁrm. Accordingly, we conclude that the use of a repeated
measures ANOVA model is appropriate as it allows us to control for
these unmeasured ﬁrm-level factors and focus on the effects of IFRS
adoption. Since stakeholder orientation, as measured by legal origin
is constant during all periods, we ran the model separately for the
stakeholder and shareholder ﬁrm groups to capture the potential
variation in CSD as a result of the adoption of IFRS based on
stakeholder-orientation.11
Table 6 presents the F-value results of the repeated measures
ANOVA for the stakeholder-oriented and shareholder-oriented ﬁrms.
The adjusted R2 for the models were 0.684 and 0.473, respectively.
Overall we ﬁnd that the level of CSD in annual reports from our sample
ﬁrms increased after IFRS adoption as evidenced by the positive coefﬁcient for reporting period (pre-IFRS adoption versus post-IFRS adoption). However, the increase in the level of CSD from stakeholder
countries was not statistically signiﬁcant whereas the level of CSD in annual reports signiﬁcantly increased after the adoption of IFRS for ﬁrms
domiciled in shareholder-oriented countries. In answer to our research
question these results imply that IFRS adoption differentially affects CSD
in annual reports dependent on whether the disclosing ﬁrm is from a
traditionally shareholder or stakeholder-oriented country.12 Accordingly, stakeholder orientation does matter when considering the effect of
IFRS adoption on CSD in annual reports.
To further analyze the year to year variation in CSD for our sample
ﬁrms, we conducted paired samples t-tests within the stakeholder and
shareholder groups. Table 7 presents the paired-samples t-test results
for the differences in CSD means between each year of the sample period and 2003/2004 and 2006/2007 combined for CSD and the components of CSD for companies in the stakeholder group and separately,
for those in the shareholder group. From 2003 to 2004, the year prior
to adoption of IFRS, stakeholder countries experienced a signiﬁcant
(p b 0.05) decline in the level of CSD while the shareholder countries
experienced a marginally signiﬁcant (p b 0.10) increase. After adoption
of IFRS, in 2006 and 2007 both the stakeholder (not statistically
signiﬁcant) and shareholder (p b 0.10) countries experienced increases
in the level of CSD.
As shown in Table 7, statistically signiﬁcant increases from 2003/
2004 to 2006/2007 were observed for the shareholder countries in the
mean level of disclosure for the following components of CSD; corruption (p b 0.10); water use (p b 0.05); energy use (p b 0.01); global
warming (p b 0.05); waste management (p b 0.05) and, consolidation
11
Since other country-level factors (i.e., culture, level of investor protection, strength of
regulation, ownership structure, etc.) and ﬁrm speciﬁc variables (i.e., industry) are constant across every ﬁrm, we were unable to control for them in our model as these variables
are a linear combination of all company indicator variables making their effects nonestimable in a model with company included.
12
Results (untabulated) remain unchanged when the environmentally sensitive ﬁrms
are excluded from the analyses.
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Table 4
Components of corporate social disclosure (shareholder).
2003
mean
(Std. Dev.)
(Firms)

Table 6
F-value (Sig.) results of the repeated measures ANOVA.

2004
mean
(Std. Dev.)
(Firms)

2006
mean
(Std. Dev.)
(Firms)

2007
mean
(Std. Dev.)
(Firms)

2003/2007
change
mean
(Std. Dev.)

15.94
−4.64
16
1.44
−0.63
16
3.38
−1.03
16
0.69
−0.87
8
1.06
−0.68
13
1.75
−0.45
16
1.00
0.00
16
0.38
−0.62
5
0.69
−1.08
7
0.69
−0.70
9
0.06
−0.25
1
0.63
−0.72
8
4.19
−1.33
16

17.44
−8.73
16
1.44
−0.81
16
3.25
−1.29
16
0.56
−0.81
7
1.06
−0.93
12
1.75
−0.45
16
1.06
−0.44
15
0.56
−1.09
5
1.06
−1.24
10
0.88
−1.03
9
0.00
0.00
0
1.31
−2.15
8
3.81
−5.05
16

19.63
−10.18
16
1.56
−0.81
16
3.19
−1.47
16
0.69
−0.87
8
1.31
−0.79
14
1.75
−0.45
16
1.31
−0.60
16
1.13
−1.54
10
1.19
−1.28
12
1.13
−1.15
11
0.31
−0.79
3
1.38
−1.86
10
4.69
−1.62
16

4.44
−5.96

Source of variation

Stakeholdera (n = 27)

Shareholderb (n = 16)

Firm
Reporting period

4.726 (.000)
0.345 (.559)

9.634 (.000)
8.110 (.007)

a

Total corporate
social disclosures

15.19
−4.22
16
Trade, investment
1.44
and linkages
−0.63
16
Employment
3.50
creation and
−1.03
labor practices
16
Technology and
0.50
human resource
−0.63
development
7
Health and safety
1.00
−0.73
12
Government and
1.69
community
−0.48
contributions
16
Corruption
1.00
0.00
16
0.19
Water use
−0.54
2
Energy use
0.63
−1.03
7
Global warming
0.44
−0.81
5
Ozone-depleting
0.06
substances (ODS) −0.25
1
Waste
0.56
management
−0.63
8
Consolidation
4.19
policies
−1.42
16

0.12
−0.18
−0.31
−0.44
0.19
−0.24
0.31
−0.06
0.06
0.03
0.31
−0.60
0.94
−1.00
0.56
−0.25
0.69
−0.34
0.25
−0.54
0.82
−1.23
0.50
−0.20

policies (p b 0.10). The stakeholder countries experienced statistically
signiﬁcant increases from 2003/2004 to 2006/2007 in the mean level
of disclosure for the following components of CSD; health and safety
(p b 0.05); corruption (p b 0.10); energy use (p b 0.10); and, global
warming (p b 0.05). Additionally, a signiﬁcant (p b 0.10) decrease
was observed in the trade, investment and linkages component for
stakeholder countries.
Results of the ANOVA with repeated measures and paired-samples ttests presented in Table 7 indicate that CSD increased signiﬁcantly
(p b 0.05) in the shareholder countries from the period prior to the
adoption of IFRS (2003–2004) to the period following the adoption of
IFRS (2006–2007) as well as from 2003 to 2007. However, the minimal

Table 5
Firm-level variables (shareholder).
Variable

Net income
(€m)
Leverage
(total liabilities /
total assets)
Number of pages

2003

2004

2006

2007

2003/2007

(Std. Dev.)

(Std. Dev.)

(Std. Dev.)

(Std. Dev.)

Change

1933.53
−5977.18
0.75
−0.23

3321.80
−7327.10
0.75
−0.22

5636.24
−9712.32
0.77
−0.20

6806.52
−8537.38
0.77
−0.20

4872.99
−2560.20
0.02
0.03

173.25
−91.24

180.19
−89.76

219.69
−96.78

213.06
−86.56

39.81
4.68

b

Adjusted R2 = 0.684, F-statistic = 9.538, p = 0.000.
Adjusted R2 = 0.473, F-statistic = 4.563, p = 0.000.

change in CSD in the stakeholder-oriented countries was not signiﬁcant
in either of these periods.13 We believe these results suggest that a
country's stakeholder/shareholder orientation inﬂuences ﬁrms' reactions to adoption of IFRS. Firms in shareholder-oriented countries are
responding to the increased pressure to provide more CSD while ﬁrms
in stakeholder-oriented countries did not have a similar response.
4.3. Additional analyses
We recognize that there are other institutional factors that may distinguish one country from another that the legal origin distinction of
stakeholder orientation does not capture. To further substantiate our
ﬁndings, we considered (1) ﬁrms that adopted IFRS early, (2) countries
that experienced changes in CSR disclosure requirements during our
sample period, and (3) environmentally sensitive industry membership.
Six of the EU companies identiﬁed on the 2005 Fortune Global 500
list prepared their 2003 and 2004 annual reports following IFRS. All of
these ﬁrms were from Germany, a stakeholder-oriented country. However, given their use of IFRS for their 2003 and 2004 annual reports we
would expect these ﬁrms to react to the pressure to provide CSD similar
to the shareholder-oriented country ﬁrms, as these ﬁrms had already
moved to a shareholder-oriented reporting system. Therefore, we
should see a signiﬁcant increase in the level of CSD after adoption of
IFRS for these control ﬁrms. Results of a repeated measures ANOVA,
not reported, reveal that the mean level of CSD for the control ﬁrms increased signiﬁcantly (p b 0.01) from the period prior to the adoption of
IFRS (2003 and 2004) to the period following the adoption of IFRS (2006
and 2007). These results further support our ﬁnding that ﬁrm reactions
to the mandatory disclosure requirements of IFRS are inﬂuenced by the
disclosing ﬁrm's previous reporting orientation, stakeholder or
shareholder.
Two countries, Belgium and the UK, had changes in their CSR disclosure requirements from 2003 to 2007. In October 2006, the Federal Action Plan for CSR went into effect in Belgium to advance CSR and
encourage its use in management. During that same year, the London
Stock Exchange began requiring all listed companies to disclose information on material environmental, workplace, social, and community
dealings (IRI, 2014). We excluded the ﬁrms domiciled in these two
countries and re-ran the ANOVA with repeated measures. Consistent
with our previous ﬁndings (not tabulated), after adoption of IFRS, in
2006 and 2007 both the stakeholder (not statistically signiﬁcant) and
shareholder (p b 0.10) countries experienced increases in the level of
CSD. Six of the ﬁrms included in our sample were in environmentally
sensitive industries including chemicals and allied products (1), petroleum and coal products (4), and primary metal industries (1). Four of
these ﬁrms were domiciled in stakeholder-oriented countries and the
remaining two were domiciled in a shareholder-oriented country. It is
possible that the ﬁrms in environmentally sensitive industries faced
more stakeholder and institutional pressure to provide CSD than ﬁrms
in other industries. To determine if the environmentally sensitive
ﬁrms inﬂuenced our results we removed these ﬁrms and reran our
analyses. The ﬁndings from our main analyses remain unchanged

13
A paired samples t-test was also run for each individual country in the stakeholder
sample. The ﬁndings were consistent with the stakeholder grouping. The results are not
presented but are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 7
Paired-samples t-test results: difference in means (t-statistic) within groups.
Components of corporate
social disclosure

Stakeholder
2003/2004
(n = 27)

2006/2007
(n = 27)

2003/04 2006/07
(n = 54)

2003/2007
(n = 27)

2003/2004
(n = 16)

2006/2007
(n = 16)

Total corporate social disclosures

−2.56
(−2.319)⁎⁎
−0.15
(−2.126)⁎⁎

0.48
(0.437)
0.11
(1.803)⁎⁎
−0.04
(−.214)
−0.04
(−.296)
−0.11
(−1)
0.07
(1)
0.04
(0.57)
0.30
(0.969)
0.00
(0)
−0.07
(−.493)
0.04
(0.44)
0.15
(0.745)
0.04
(0.57)

1.19
(0.44)
−0.185
(−1.55)⁎

−0.44
(−.225)
−0.11
(−1.363)⁎
−0.59
(−1.344)
−0.15
(−.642)
0.19
(0.866)
0.07
(0.811)
0.19
(1.727)⁎

0.75
(1.539)⁎
0.00
(0.000)
−0.13
(−0.620)
0.19
(1.861)⁎⁎
0.06
(0.324)
0.06
(1.000)
n/c

2.19
(1.626)⁎
0.13
(1.464)⁎

0.26
(0.719)
0.15
(0.625)
0.22
(0.947)
−0.11
(−.648)
−0.30
(−.730)
−0.26
(−.838)

0.19
(1.000)
0.06
(0.565)
0.25
(1.464)⁎

Trade, investment and linkages
Employment creation and labor practices
Technology and human resource development
Health and safety
Government and community contributions
Corruption
Water use
Energy use
Global warming
Ozone-depleting substances (ODS)
Waste management
Consolidation policies

−0.41
(−1.462)⁎
−0.19
(−1.154)
−0.15
(−1.072)
−0.04
(−0.440)
0.07
(1)
−0.22
(−1.140)
−0.19
(−1.154)
−0.26
(−1.427)⁎
−0.19
(−1.154)
−0.52
(−2.009)⁎⁎
−0.33
(−1.472)⁎

Shareholder

−0.74
(−1.14)
−0.07
(−.22)
0.63
(1.74)⁎⁎
0.11
(0.9)
0.26
(1.43)⁎
0.44
(1.14)
0.48
(1.44)⁎
0.78
(2.45)⁎⁎
−0.07
(−.40)
−0.22
(−.38)
−0.22
(−.42)

n/c
0.06
(0.436)
0.00
(0.000)

−0.06
(−.0.180)
0.13
(1.464)⁎
0.25
(1.464)⁎
0.00
(0.000)
0.25
(2.236)⁎⁎
0.56
(1.952)⁎⁎
0.13
(0.522)
0.25
(0.939)
0.31
(1.576)⁎
0.06
(0.113)
0.19
(0.565)

2003/04 2006/07
(n = 32)

2003/2007
(n = 16)

5.94
(2.000)⁎⁎
0.13
(0.565)
−0.44
(−0.835)
0.06
(0.293)
0.31
(0.771)
0.06
(0.436)
0.38
(1.567)⁎

4.44
(2.449)⁎⁎
0.13
(1.000)
−0.31
(−0.837)
0.19
(1.379)⁎
0.31
(1.321)
0.06
(0.565)
0.31
(2.076)⁎⁎

1.13
(1.928)⁎⁎
0.94
(3.033)⁎⁎⁎

0.94
(2.390)⁎⁎
0.56
(2.764)⁎⁎⁎

0.88
(2.206)⁎⁎
0.19
(0.899)
1.50
(2.257)⁎⁎
0.81
(1.544)⁎

0.69
(2.300)⁎⁎
0.25
(1.291)
0.81
(2.030)⁎⁎
0.50
(1.195)

n/c = no change in the mean for the two time periods compared.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01 based on a one-tailed test.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05 based on a one-tailed test.
⁎ p b 0.10 based on a one-tailed test.

when these ﬁrms were excluded. Given the small sample size we were
unable to conduct speciﬁc analyses of these ﬁrms.
5. Conclusions
In this study we explore the impact of the adoption of IFRS on CSD in
annual reports within the context of stakeholder theory. Examining the
annual reports of companies in the EU and Australia around the 2005
IFRS adoption date we ﬁnd that adoption of IFRS had a differential impact on CSD in annual reports based on ﬁrms' institutional setting.
Firms domiciled in traditionally shareholder-oriented countries
responded to the increasing interest in CSD by providing signiﬁcantly
more CSD post-IFRS adoption as compared to the pre-adoption period.
Whereas ﬁrms domiciled in traditionally stakeholder-oriented countries appeared to shift their focus away from CSD to shareholder
demands, i.e., more ﬁnancial disclosures, resulting in no signiﬁcant
change in the level of CSD after IFRS adoption. Further after IFRS adoption the overall level of CSD provided by shareholder countries was
higher than that provided by stakeholder countries reversing the
position found prior to IFRS adoption. Following stakeholder theory
we believe that these results, although preliminary, reﬂect changing
stakeholder–management relationships as ﬁrms appear to shift disclosure priorities in response to the mandatory adoption of IFRS.
The traditional institutional environment in stakeholder-oriented
countries encourages managers to accord non-shareholding stakeholders the same level of legitimacy as shareholding stakeholders.
This is reﬂected in accounting systems that require fewer ﬁnancial disclosures than what is typically found in shareholder-oriented countries.
The adoption of IFRS, with its focus on ﬁnancial disclosures, creates a
sense of urgency associated with the shareholder–management relationship in stakeholder-oriented countries. This same sense of urgency
does not appear to be experienced in shareholder-oriented countries.

This differential shift in the focus associated with the shareholder
group manifests through the differential change in the level of CSD provided in annual reports between shareholder and stakeholder-oriented
countries. The ﬁndings from this study suggest a relation between mandatory and voluntary disclosures and also imply that the adoption of
IFRS differentially affects the level of CSD in annual reports dependent
on whether the disclosing ﬁrm is from a traditionally stakeholder or
shareholder-oriented country. Further, our ﬁndings suggest that
stakeholder theory provides a basis for predicting the level of CSD.
Our results should be interpreted with certain limitations in mind.
First we considered only the largest ﬁrms over a relatively short period
of time in which the ﬁnancial reporting environment was in transition.
Results in a more stable reporting environment may be different.
Second, our distinction between shareholder and stakeholder-oriented
countries based on legal origin does not reﬂect all institutional differences which may inﬂuence ﬁnancial reporting between countries. Finally, the content analysis of the annual reports requires judgment that
may be subject to researcher biases. While we attempted to mitigate
these biases through our research design they remain a concern with
any content analysis study. Given these limitations our ﬁndings should
be viewed as tentative.
We do believe our ﬁndings on the impact of IFRS on CSD extend
cross-national accounting research by drawing attention to countrylevel inﬂuences on CSD under IFRS. Further, our ﬁndings provide support for the use of stakeholder theory to predict the level of CSD; ﬁrms
appear to be reacting to stakeholder pressure to provide CSD but it is
muted by the institutional environment. Thus, these ﬁndings have
interesting implications for regulators as they consider disclosure issues
and for preparers and users of IFRS based ﬁnancial statements. The oft
quoted axiom “what gets measured gets managed” (attributed to
Peter Drucker) appears to reﬂect the shifting disclosure patterns
between ﬁnancial disclosures and CSD.
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Appendix A
CSD in Annual Report Data Collection Instrument

17d.
17d1.
17d2.
17e.
17f.

Total water consumption
Total return ﬂow
Water consumption per category
Qualitative info on the wastewater treat tech
Managements' position on the water use policy

Energy use
18a.
18b.
18c.
18d.
18e.

Energy requirement /unit of net value added
Accounting policies adopted on energy use
Amounts of energy source recognized during the period
Total energy required/recognized during the period
Management's position on the energy use policy

Trade, Investment and Linkages
1.
2.
3.
4.

Total revenues or Income (proceeds)
Value of imports vs. exports
Total new investments
Local purchasing

Employment Creation and Labor Practices
5a.
5b.
5c.
5d.
5e.
6a.
6b.
6c.
7a.
7b.
8.

Total workforce
By employment type
By employment contract
By gender/women
By geographic area
Employee wages and beneﬁts
Breakdown by employment type
By gender/women
Total number and rate of employee turnover
Broken down by gender
Percentage of employees covered by collective agreements

Technology and Human Resource Development
9.
10a.
10b.
11a.
11b.

Expenditure on R&D
Average hours of training/year/employee
Broken down by employee category
Expenditure on employee training/year/employee
By employee category

Health and Safety
12. Cost of employee health and safety
13. Work days lost due to accidents, injuries, and illness
13a. Management position on employee health issues
Government and Community Contributions
14. Payments to Government (taxes paid)
15. Voluntary/social contributions to civil society (amount)
Corruption
16a. Number of convictions for corruption related laws
16b. Amount of ﬁnes paid/payable
16c. Management position on corruption/ethics
Eco-Efﬁciency Indicators
Water use
17a.
17b.
17c.
17c1.

Water consumption/net value added
Accounting policies adopted on water use.
Total water received
By source and use category

Global warming (greenhouse)
19a.
19b.
19c.
19d.
19e.

Global warming contribution/unit of net value added
Accounting policies for global warming gases
Amount of global warming gas recognized by category
Total global warming contribution
Management's position on energy use and global warming targets

Ozone-depleting substances (ODS)
20a.
20b.
20c.
20d.
20e.

Dependency on ODS per net value added
Accounting policies adopted for ODS
Amount of ODS recognized during the year
Total ozone depletion contribution recognized in the year
Managements' position on ODS and the Montreal Protocol

Waste management
21a.
21b.
21c.
21d.
21e.
21f.
21g.
21h.

Waste generated per unit of net value added
Accounting policy adopted on waste
Total amount of waste recognized during the period
Quality of waste recognized
Classiﬁcation of waste recognized
Treatment technology recognized
Energy recovery in waste-to-energy schemes
Mgmt.'s position on waste mgmt. policy

Consolidation Policies
22a. Names of all subsidiaries, investments in associates and joint
ventures (JVs)
22a1. Descriptions of all subs, investments in associations and joint
ventures
22b. Magnitude of control (% of voting shares)
22c. Consolidation method used in ﬁnancial statements
22d. Eco-efﬁciency of all consolidated entities regardless of method of
consolidation
22e. Management discussion on ﬁnancial and environmental aspects
of consolidation methodology applied
22f. Management discussion on the ﬁn and environmental aspect of
mergers, acquisitions or divestures in the period
22g. Management discussion on sustainable projects/growth/objectives
Data and indicators based on the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development Guidance on CR Indicators in Annual Reports (2008) and Manual for the preparers and Users of Eco-efﬁciency
Indicators (2004).
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